An estimated 26 million workers are electronically monitored by organizations. Contradictory evidence indicates that such monitoring may lead to either positive or negative outcomes for both organizations and their members. This article applies theories of organizational justice and concertive control to account for these contradictions. It is argued that, when organizations involve employees in the design and implementation of monitoring systems, restrict monitoring to performance-related activities, and use data obtained through electronic means in a concertive manner by emphasizing two-way communication and supportive feedback, they are likely to reap positive results. However, when employees are not involved in the introduction of monitoring, when data gathered through electronic performance monitoring are used to provide coercive, obtrusive feedback, or when monitoring includes nonwork activities, the organization may experience negative results.

Organizations have evaluated and monitored their members for centuries (U.S. Congress, 1987). Concurrent with society's rapid transition to a postindustrial or information society (Mulgan, 1991), however, employers have begun using electronic technology to monitor employees. The various forms of electronic monitoring organizations employ include telephone call accounting, keystroke or computer time accounting, cards and beepers to monitor locations, computer file monitoring, screen sharing capabilities on networks, telephone call observation, and video camera observation (Fickel, 1991). These technological devices have the capability to record when a worker turns on or off a video display terminal (VDT), count key strokes by the second, time customer service transactions, track the number of operator errors (Nussbaum & duRivage, 1986), and provide managers with the ability to watch workers' every action without their knowledge (Marx, 1990). In essence, electronic monitoring capabilities provide organizations with panoptic power (Mulgan, 1991).

Although estimates of the number of monitored employees vary, most observers agree that the use of electronic performance monitoring (EPM) is extensive. For example, Nine to Five (1990) estimates that firms currently monitor more than 26 million workers, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) estimates that two thirds of VDT users are monitored (Nussbaum & duRivage, 1986), and the Congressional Office of Technology Assistance (OTA) believes that employers listen in on 400 million telephone calls between workers and consumers each year (Reynolds, 1993). These high estimates were more than supported by a survey of data processing, word processing, and customer service operations in 110 work sites that found that 98% of the work sites used computers to continuously track workers' movements (Nussbaum & duRivage, 1986).

The increasing use of electronic monitoring has resulted in considerable debate among politicians, employee advocate groups, and business groups (Sanders, 1990; U.S. Congress, 1987). Opponents of monitoring claim that it invades consumer and employee privacy, decreases employee job satisfaction, and increases stress (Aiello, 1993; Piturro, 1989). Its proponents counter that not only can electronic monitoring be used to increase productivity but also to increase employee satisfaction and improve morale (Aiello, 1993; Griffith, 1993; Marx, 1992; Nebeker & Tatum, 1993).

Despite the interest and attention electronic monitoring has generated among various groups, however, little empirical or theoretical work has been done on the impact of electronic performance monitoring (Aiello & Svec, 1993). Aiello and Svec (1993, p. 538) describe the state-of-the-art in electronic monitoring research by arguing that, "empirical investigations on the topic were rare and studies assessing the effects of work performance under computer monitored conditions were virtually nonexistent." Consequently, both advocates and opponents of electronic monitoring rely primarily on case examples and anecdotal evidence to support their arguments.

This article will address this lack of theoretical research by outlining the major arguments for and against electronic performance monitoring and subsequently applying theories from both organizational behavior and organizational communication to illuminate conditions under which electronic performance monitoring should lead to either positive or negative results.

Three main issues are at the heart of most debates over the evils and virtues of electronic monitoring: employee privacy, work satisfaction, and organizational performance. This section will expand on the major claims made by opponents of electronic monitoring regarding these issues.

PRIVACY

A common argument opponents make against electronic monitoring is that it invades worker privacy. As support for their claims, opponents of EPM cite numerous examples of employers who have gone beyond reasonably acceptable grounds and invaded their employees' privacy. One common story concerns an organization that places hidden video cameras in employee dressing rooms and broadcasts worker activities over in-house cable channels (Galvin, 1993). Other stories include accounts of employers posting the amount of time employees spend in the bathroom each day. Clearly, close supervision of nonwork activities, such as the number of trips to the bathroom, can make employees feel as though their privacy has been eroded and as though their dignity has been compromised (Aiello, 1993).

The issue of privacy invasion also entails questions of ethicality and may have legal ramifications for organizations. In response to this concern, several senators and members of Congress have repeatedly introduced legislation intended to limit the monitoring that employers may perform. Significant efforts to legislate monitoring have been made by Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) who has introduced several related bills aimed at restricting employee monitoring. Recently, he introduced S. 984 (The Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act). First introduced in 1993 and still pending in Congress, this bill intends to safeguard employee privacy by prohibiting employers from intentionally collecting personal information about employees unless the data are related to the employee's work; by forbidding employers from disseminating data gained through electronic monitoring to anyone except those within the organization who have a legitimate need for it; by prohibiting employers from electronically monitoring bathrooms, locker rooms, or dressing rooms; and by forbidding them from electronically monitoring employees through the use of hidden video cameras (for a complete analysis of the bill, see DeTienne & Alder, 1995).

STRESS

In addition to arguing that electronic monitoring invades privacy, critics of the practice claim it is detrimental because it leads to increased worker stress. Due to the stress electronic monitoring may lead to, some have referred to monitoring as an "electronic whip," whereas others have referred to monitored workplaces as "electronic sweatshops" (Garson, 1988; Nussbaum & duRivage, 1986). There is a significant amount of empirical evidence that supports the claim that monitoring may increase stress. In a survey of 700 employees from 49 companies, conducted by the Massachusetts Coalition on New Office Technology, 81% said monitoring made their job more stressful (Ross, 1992). Similarly, a NIOSH investigation found that highly monitored workers exhibited a higher degree of depression, anxiety, instability, fatigue, and anger than did nonmonitored workers (Nussbaum & duRivage, 1986).

These investigations were supported by a study conducted by the University of Wisconsin and the Communication Workers of America (CWA) that compared the attitudes of monitored workers to those of unmonitored workers. This investigation revealed three important results. First, 81% of the monitored employees reported being depressed, as opposed to 69% of those not monitored. Second, of those monitored, 72% felt extreme anxiety, compared to only 57% of those who were not monitored. Finally, 57% of employees who were monitored by the number of keystrokes they entered complained of sore wrists, a ratio double the rate of un-monitored workers who experienced sore wrists (Smith, Sainfort, Rogers, & Legrande, 1990).

PERFORMANCE

Opponents of electronic monitoring claim that in addition to increasing employee stress, the practice hurts organizational performance by forcing workers to sacrifice quality and service. As with stress and anxiety arguments, those espousing this point of view are able to rely on several empirical investigations that indicate monitoring may adversely impact productivity and quality.

One such study (Grant, Higgins, & Irving, 1988) compared the behavior of monitored workers to that of unmonitored workers performing the same task in a service sector firm. This investigation found that the use of electronic performance monitoring encouraged employees to focus on the quantity of work produced and to sacrifice customer service. In addition, it found that monitoring led to eroded teamwork and cooperation. Another investigation into the impact of electronic monitoring in several telecommunication organizations revealed that, due to monitoring standards, directory assistance operators felt they could not provide the high-quality service they wanted to (Aiello, 1993). Similarly, the Massachusetts Coalition on New Office Technology study referred to previously discovered that 65% of those surveyed reported that they could not do a quality job because monitoring practices forced them to work too fast (Ross, 1992).

Opponents of monitoring also cite the results some companies have experienced after eliminating electronic monitoring practices. For example, when AT&T eliminated covert monitoring of operators in its Hotel Billing Information Systems department, the company experienced an improvement in quality of service rendered, a decline in customer complaints, a decrease in absenteeism, a drop in management costs, and a reduction in employee grievances ("CWA calls monitoring 'menace,'" 1994).

In contrast to the arguments raised by opponents of electronic monitoring, its proponents contend that the practice benefits both organizations and individual employees.

ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS OF EPM

Proponents of electronic monitoring frequently rely on case examples and anecdotal evidence to argue that electronic performance monitoring may be an effective tool for increasing quality and productivity in a variety of settings. At GE, for example, "coaches" record telephone conversations between employees and customers and subsequently play back some of the conversations to the agents to enhance the quality of their dealings with the public. The company believes that this monitoring is largely responsible for its 96% customer satisfaction rate (Bylinsky, 1991). MCI and Pacific Bell have obtained similar customer service improvements through the use of electronic monitoring (Gerdelman, 1993). Case examples also support the idea that monitoring may be used to increase productivity. A California Insurance Company, for example, realized a 300-hour drop in monthly telephone usage and a productivity increase equal to 7.5 person-weeks per month after using a call accounting system for 1 month. This productivity improvement resulted in a 15%, $81,000, monthly cost savings (Tucker, 1992).

Although proponents of electronic monitoring frequently refer to case studies and anecdotal accounts to argue that monitoring improves organizational performance, empirical investigations have also demonstrated that organizations may obtain positive results from electronic monitoring. Aiello and Kolb (1995), for example, found that high-ability participants performed faster when they were monitored than when their work was not observed. Griffith (1993) similarly found that electronically monitored data entry workers performed at a steadier rate than did workers who were monitored by a human supervisor.

Nebeker and Tatum (1993) hired database operators to perform a data management task in a controlled experiment. These operators were separated into six groups that worked under different levels of performance standards. Four of the six groups were assigned performance standards, and performance against the standard was monitored for these groups. The results of this experiment indicate that those who were aware that their performance was being recorded and were given performance feedback, were more productive than workers who were either not monitored, or were unaware that they were being monitored. Significantly, this increased productivity did not come at the expense of increased stress, reduced satisfaction, or lower quality.

EMPLOYEE BENEFITS FROM EPM

Supporters also argue that monitoring benefits employees by improving performance feedback and evaluation. Monitors can make data about performance available more quickly and frequently, enhancing employee awareness of personal productivity and enabling them to take corrective action when necessary (Grant & Higgins, 1989). The increased awareness of one's own performance made possible by electronic monitoring may also help employees avoid the stress commonly associated with evaluation uncertainty.

Advocates of electronic monitoring also argue that monitoring improves the consistency, clarity, objectivity, and accuracy of performance measurement and, therefore, is an improvement over stressful subjective evaluations performed by human supervisors (Grant & Higgins, 1989). Repeated research has demonstrated that the accuracy of traditional approaches to performance appraisal, which often rely on subjective judgments of performance, is limited by various sources of rater bias (DeNisi, Cafferty, & Meglino, 1984). The objective data provided by electronic monitoring, however, may eliminate much of the bias potentially present in performance appraisals (Henriques, 1986a, 1986b). Grant and Higgins (1989), for example, point out that the software programs that comprise a computer monitoring system cannot favor one employee over another or discriminate against particular employees. Instead, the computer records results with absolute accuracy regardless of race, age, gender, or any other characteristic of the employee (Kallman, 1993).

These arguments are supported by the results of a laboratory experiment conducted by Fenner, Lerch, and Kulik (1993). This study found that computerized monitoring increases evaluation accuracy by permitting supervisors to devise information search strategies best suited to the appraisal and by reducing the occurrence of memory-related biases. Surveys have demonstrated that both electronically monitored employees and their supervisors believe that computer performance monitoring systems provide more objective data about performance than traditional forms of monitoring (Eisenman, 1986). Irving, Higgins, and Safayeni (1986), for example, found that the monitored workers they interviewed reported a closer tie between their organization's reward and evaluation system. Westin similarly interviewed several dozen employees who said they were satisfied with their employer's computerized performance monitoring system because they "wouldn't want to be dependent only on the subjective judgments of a supervisor, who might be someone you didn't get along well with" (1986, p. 76).

In view of these conflicting arguments, it is apparent that there is no clear answer as to whether electronic performance monitoring is another form of abusive control that demoralizes employees and hinders organizational performance. Rather, it is evident that there exist contingencies under which this type of control may prove beneficial to employers and employees alike. Conversely, there are also conditions under which this practice may demoralize and alienate the workforce. Under such circumstances, it is expected that workers will resist this new form of control and that it will not only prove detrimental to the workforce but also reduce corporate productivity and profitability.

A growing stream of research supports this contingency point of view. Eisenman (1986), for example, found that the monitored workers he surveyed were not concerned about monitoring because they had adapted to it, had learned to minimize its possible negative effects, and were buffered from it by their supervisors. Nebeker and Tatum (1993) similarly found that, when electronic monitoring systems are properly designed, organizations may gain the benefits of increased productivity, heightened satisfaction, and reduced stress. Finally, Aiello and Svec (1993) argue that the way employers, managers, and employees use the information gathered through monitoring and the nature of the existing relationship between the manager and the employee are the most important factors in determining the reaction to and the impact of computer-based monitoring.

The remainder of this article will build on this research by describing the conditions under which the potential negative outcomes of monitoring may be rendered nugatory, resulting in positive employee responses and improved organizational performance. This will be accomplished by integrating theories of organizational identification, organizational justice, concertive control, and the double interact of control to argue that firms must be concerned with both what they monitor and how they use data obtained from monitoring.

Specifically, when organizations involve their members in the design and implementation of the monitoring system, restrict monitoring to performance-related activities, and use the data to provide concertive feedback, electronic performance monitoring will benefit employees and lead to improved individual and organizational performance. However, when members are not involved in the implementation of monitoring, when monitoring includes personal, nonwork activities, or when it is used in connection with threatening or coercive feedback procedures, workers may respond negatively and monitoring may prove detrimental to company performance.

Simon (1976) indicates that organizations move toward the attainment of their goals through decision making and that management's task is to provide organization members with a set of decision premises to use when making decisions. By providing a set of decision premises, argues Simon, organizations are able to control their members' behavior. Because the most effective form of control may be obtained by influencing members to accept organizational motives (Barnard, 1938), organizations take several steps to ensure that workers will adopt their decision premises. Several factors, including the necessity to sacrifice a degree of autonomy to participate in organizations (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985), reward systems and structures (Barnard, 1938; Simon, 1976), and the aura of authority (Barnard, 1938) all serve to help ensure that an organization's decision premises will be accepted by its members.

Despite these influences, however, Tompkins and Cheney (1985) point out that organizations often fail to exercise complete control over their members' decisions. This is evident in the occurrence of disruptive activities such as subordinate disobedience or employee strikes. Tompkins and Cheney (1985) argue that this failure to control employees' decisions may stem from two closely related factors. First, individual members have personal decisional premises that compete with the organization's. Second, the informal organization may attempt to provide the employee with a competing set of decisional premises. To maintain complete control, therefore, companies must get members to accept organizational premises as their own and adhere to them more strongly than to those provided by the informal organization.

The process of organizational identification is a powerful tool in assuring that members accept firm decision premises (Bullis & Tompkins, 1989; Simon, 1976; Tompkins & Cheney, 1985). According to Simon (1976, p. 205), organizational identification and loyalty "lead members to evaluate courses of action in terms of the consequences of their actions for the organization when making decisions." Similarly, Tompkins and Cheney (1983, p. 144) argue that "a person identifies with a unit when, in making a decision, the person in one or more of his roles perceives that unit's values or interests as relevant in evaluating the alternatives of choice." Tompkins and Cheney (1985, p. 194) carry this a step farther with the claim that "a decision maker identifies with an organization when he or she desires to choose the alternative that best promotes the perceived interests of that organization."

Thus organizational identification leads members to consider the organization's interests above other parties' interests and to employ organizationally appropriate premises when making decisions (Bullis & Tompkins, 1989). In addition, organizational identification guarantees these results because it leads members to adopt an organization personality (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985) whereby, within an area of acceptance or zone of indifference (Barnard 1938; Simon, 1976), the employee plays the role of organization and accepts the organization's premises as relevant to decisions. Thus, as members identify more with an organization and its values, the organization becomes as much a part of the member as the member is a part of the organization. As a result, members allow organizational decision premises to be inculcated into them (Bullis & Tompkins, 1989) and the impact of conflicting personal or informal organization decision premises is eliminated.

The powerful role that organizational identification plays in controlling members' decisions has been substantiated through several empirical investigations. Kaufman's (1960) seminal investigation of management practices in the Forest Service, for example, has led subsequent theorists to recognize that organization, at least during the time Kaufman was studying it, as an exemplar of the effectiveness of organizational identification (Bullis, 1991; Simon, 1976; Tompkins & Cheney, 1985). Kaufman (1960) described how organizational practices resulted in such strong identification that, despite vast distances between management and employees, Forest Service employees invariably made the same decisions management would have made. In a later study of the same organization, Bullis and Tompkins (1989) found that those who reported high levels of identification used organizationally appropriate decision premises and considered the organization in their decision making more frequently than those who reported low levels of identification.

Simon (1976) argues that identification is a master premise that individuals bring with them to the organization. However, the degree to which members identify with their organization varies from organization to organization and even within organizations (Bullis & Tompkins, 1989). In addition, although members come to an organization with a preexisting level of identification, identification is not a static phenomenon and managerial practices can serve to either strengthen or diminish the degree to which members identify with the organization. Thus, although Kaufman's (1960) investigation characterized the Forest Service as an exemplar of organizational identification, Bullis and Tompkins (1989) found that changes in management practice had greatly reduced the degree to which Forest Service personnel identified with the service. This discussion of the importance of organizational identification in controlling members' decisions to achieve organization goals yields the following proposition:

Proposition 1: Organizations that develop and maintain high levels of organizational identification among their members will outperform organizations that fail to instill or maintain high levels of organizational identification.

A key to organizational success, then, is to employ management practices that will build on preexisting levels of identification and lead to increased levels of organizational identification. The following sections will rely on two closely related theories to describe how electronic performance monitoring may be utilized to increase organizational identification and, ultimately, performance. First, from organizational behavior, theories of organizational justice are analyzed. Second, from organizational communication theory, concepts of concertive control are applied.

Proponents of organizational justice theory maintain that perceived organizational fairness results in higher loyalty, commitment, satisfaction, and performance (Alexander & Ruderman, 1987; Brockner, Grover, Reed, DeWitt, & O'Malley, 1987; Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Fryxell & Gordon, 1989; Greenberg 1990). Lind and Tyler (1988, p. 179) summarize the conclusions this theory leads to with the arguments that "attitudes toward the organization as a whole, including such things as organizational commitment, loyalty, and work group cohesiveness, are strongly affected by procedural justice judgments." In a similar vein, Fryxell and Gordon (1989, p. 863) conclude their investigation of the connection between workplace justice and satisfaction with union and management with the admonition that "it would behoove management to design personnel programs, including those concerning job analyses, job evaluations, performance appraisals, and discipline with the notion of workplace justice in mind."

The group-value model of organizational justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988) provides an explanation of how organizational justice results in commitment that closely parallels theories of organizational identification. According to this model, people value their relationships with individuals, groups, and organizations because it is through relationships that they develop their self-identity and self-worth (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; also see Tompkins & Cheney, 1985). As a result of the premium people place on their relationships, they value being treated fairly by the other party. According to Brockner, Tyler, and Cooper-Schneider (1992), fair treatment symbolizes to people that they are being dealt with in a dignified and respectful way and, as a result, strengthens their self-identity and self-worth. Consequently, fairness is theorized to result in greater organizational attachment and commitment.

The group-value model of organizational justice, with its emphasis on fairness as a way to foster feelings of organizational commitment, is consistent with Simon's (1976) conceptualization of employees' "zone of acceptance." Simon argues that if management attempts to carry authority beyond a certain point, the employees' zone of acceptance, disobedience will follow. Barnard (1938) similarly claims that authority is stable, in part, because a "zone of indifference" exists within which organizational members will not question directives, and managers usually remain within this zone when giving orders. However, when managerial practices extend beyond the zone of indifference, when they are viewed by employees as organizationally unjust, subordinate resistance and decreased organizational commitment will result.

Several empirical investigations have supported the group-value model by demonstrating that perceived organizational fairness is positively related to organizational commitment. Folger and Konovsky's (1989) survey of employee reactions to decisions about pay raises indicated that perceptions about distributive justice are strongly correlated with satisfaction, whereas judgments of procedural fairness led to increased organizational commitment. Similarly, Alexander and Ruderman's (1987) survey of federal employees revealed that evaluations of procedural justice were significantly related to attitudes such as trust in management, intention to turnover, evaluation of their supervisor, conflict/harmony, and satisfaction.

Empirical investigations such as these demonstrate that because people value their relationships, organizational fairness may result in increased commitment. Most definitions of organizational commitment include three components: belief in the organization's goals or values, willingness to expend extra effort on the organization's behalf, and intention to remain with the organization. Further, committed employees are more likely to take the extra steps necessary to further the organization's goals (Brockner et al., 1992). Thus it is clear that fair managerial practices may result in increased organizational identification and the following proposition emerges:

Proposition 2: Organizational practices that result in perceptions of justice will lead to higher levels of organizational identification than will practices that result in perceptions of injustice.

JUSTICE AND ELECTRONIC PERFORMANCE MONITORING

In addition to establishing the connection between perceived fairness and various organizational and individual outcomes, several researchers have attempted to identify the factors that contribute to perceptions of fairness (Leventhal, 1980). Greenberg (1986) asked middle managers to think of a time they had been given either a fair or unfair performance evaluation and to identify the most important factor that made it fair or unfair. Among the important determinants of fair performance appraisals were consistent application of standards, soliciting input prior to the evaluation, two-way communication, rater familiarity with ratee work, and the ability to challenge the evaluation. In addition to those factors identified by Greenberg (1986), the group value model of organizational justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988) indicates that ethicality, tradition, politeness and dignity, and value expression (voice) are all key components to judgments of procedural fairness.

Electronic performance monitoring clearly facilitates fulfillment of several of these fairness determinants. As indicated previously, one of the major advantages of electronic monitoring is that because it eliminates the bias present in subjective performance evaluations, it results in more consistent, accurate, and representative appraisals (Eisenman, 1986; Irving et al., 1986). Fulfillment of the remaining rules, however, requires that organizations take specific steps to ensure that monitoring systems are designed, introduced, and used in a way that their members will perceive as fair.

The ethicality role for procedural fairness indicates that a major concern of organizational justice, as it relates to electronic monitoring, is the scope of the monitoring. Leventhal (1980) contends that the ethicality rule dictates that methods of observation that involve deception, invade privacy, or involve bribery or spying are seen as unfair. In view of this conceptualization, it is clear that employees will consider monitoring to be fairer if it is restricted to legitimate, performance-related activities. Nevertheless, several employers have expanded the use of monitoring to include such personal things as the surveillance of employee dressing rooms (Galvin, 1993), restrictions on the number of trips to the bathroom (Nussbaum & duRivage, 1986), and the monitoring of personal phone calls (Witt, 1992).

Clearly, the extension of monitoring to include these kinds of nonwork activities will be resented by workers who may feel invaded and demeaned (Marx, 1992). In essence, this type of monitoring extends beyond organization members' zone of indifference and could result in perceptions of organizational injustice. Thus organizations should design monitoring systems so they capture only performance-related activities and the following proposition is drawn:

Proposition 3: Electronic performance monitoring systems that monitor only legitimate, work-related activities will lead to higher perceptions of organizational justice than will systems that include nonwork-related activities.

In view of the impact perceptions of organizational justice may have on organizational identification and subsequently organizational performance, Proposition 3 leads to Proposition 4:

Proposition 4: Electronic performance monitoring systems that monitor only legitimate, work-related activities will result in higher levels of organizational identification and performance than will monitoring practices that include nonwork-related activities.

Another critical fairness concern in the design and introduction of electronic monitoring is value expression. Lind and Tyler (1988) argue that organization members see procedures that provide for control and expression as fairer than those that limit control and expression because the opportunity to exercise voice constitutes a visible marker of their status as a member of the group. Consequently, Lind and Tyler recommend the inclusion of opportunities for voice, input, or control in organizational procedures where fairness is a major concern. Thus, to facilitate perceptions of fairness, organizations should solicit employee input when designing and introducing electronic monitoring systems to the workforce.

This argument is consistent with the insight provided by several research efforts on electronic monitoring. Susser (1988), for example, maintains that much of the hostility toward monitoring results because workers have been excluded from the design, testing, utilization, and adjustment of monitoring techniques. Kidwell and Bennett (1994) contend that the best way to enhance fairness is to give employees a role in setting up the system. DeTienne and Abbott (1993) similarly point out that monitoring systems are more successful if management receives employee input in the development process. They argue that participation in the design process leads employees to feel a sense of ownership in the system. As a result, they are more likely to accept and support the monitoring. Thus both work on electronic monitoring and theoretical implications of organizational justice indicate the necessity of soliciting employee input prior to the implementation of monitoring systems, and the following proposition is offered:

Proposition 5: Employees will perceive monitoring to be fairer when they are given opportunities to provide input prior to the implementation of monitoring systems than when monitoring systems are implemented without employee input.

In view of the impact that perceptions of organizational justice may have on organizational identification and subsequently organizational performance, Proposition 5 leads to Proposition 6:

Proposition 6: Higher levels of organizational identification and performance will result when employee input is solicited prior to the implementation of electronic monitoring systems than when monitoring systems are implemented without employee input.

Thus restricting monitoring to performance-related activities and soliciting employee input prior to the implementation of the monitoring system will contribute to perceptions of monitoring fairness. However, to ensure perceptions of justice, organizations must also provide employees with opportunities to challenge the evaluations derived from electronic performance monitoring. Fulfillment of this rule of organizational justice may be facilitated through concertive control and will be discussed in the following section.

Edwards (1979) argues that direction, evaluation, and reward or discipline are the primary tasks of organizational control. He further identifies three control strategies. These are (a) "simple control" where the entrepreneur/owner exercises complete power, (b) "technical control" in which the control mechanism is embedded in the physical technology of the firm, and (c) "bureaucratic control" where control is embedded in the social organization and rules of the enterprise. Electronic technology not only represents a new approach to technological control but also extends this form of control to include all three control tasks. Electronic technology may be used to prompt workers to work faster, automatically present their next piece of work, and warn them when they are falling behind standards (Nussbaum & duRivage, 1986). Thus, in contrast to Edwards's (1979) conceptualization of technical control, electronic supervision extends this form of control to include evaluation and reward as well as direction.

Edwards also maintains that historically each type of control encountered resistance from organization members, which led to the development of the subsequent control strategy (i.e., technical control arose from simple control and bureaucratic from technical). Similarly, some organizations have encountered employee resistance to electronic monitoring. Nussbaum and duRivage (1986) describe workers who cut off customers, enter incomplete data, delete documents from other workers' files, or even sabotage the machinery to slow it down. Anecdotal accounts such as these have also been supported by empirical evidence. Aiello (1993), for example, found that nearly 25% of monitored directory assistance operators cheated to reach monitoring-based standards. By disconnecting callers when a transaction might take longer than the allotted standard, operators were able to reach their goal and supervisors rewarded them.

Tompkins and Cheney (1985) argue that employee resistance to technical and bureaucratic control have led to the development of a fourth category of control: "concertive control." Tompkins and Cheney's theory of concertive control essentially maintains that identification is created through concertive, unobtrusive control practices. At the heart of concertive approaches to control lies the communication and inculcation of shared values, objectives, and means of achievement. In describing the shift from earlier control practices to concertive ones, Tompkins and Cheney (1985, p. 185) argue that "[t]he trend is away from obtrusive control ... to the unobtrusive control of workers by shared premises ... from negative sanctions that instill fear to the positive incentives of security, identification, and common mission; from personal, localized, and capricious control to the nonpersonal, pervasive and predictable."

In view of this conceptualization, it is clear that the four control strategies (simple, technical, bureaucratic, and concertive) also represent a continuum from obtrusive to unobtrusive control, with simple and technical control representing the most obtrusive forms and concertive the most unobtrusive. Thus, in this article, the terms unobtrusive and concertive control are often used interchangeably.

Several theorists have argued that unobtrusive practices designed to inculcate organization members with shared values and premises can be a powerful form of control. Lukes (1974, p. 23) argued that the "[s]upreme exercise of power is to get another or others to have the desire you want them to have ... to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires." Similarly, Clegg (1993, p. 38) claimed that "[t]he most important kinds of power were already constituted in those occasions when A's didn't have to get B's to do things because B's would do those sorts of things anyway." These sentiments are echoed in the words of Mulgan (1991, p. 73), who indicated that "[t]he most pernicious and oppressive forms of control come not from sophisticated computer systems but from the mobilization of loyalty, psychic bonds, and peer discipline."

In addition to these theoretical claims, several empirical investigations have substantiated the important roles communication, inculcation, and concertive control play in organizations. Bullis's (1991) study of the Forest Service, for example, verified claims of the importance of face-to-face communication in control. She concludes that if workers are not convinced that a policy is right (appropriate decision premises are not held and applied), Forest Service leaders encounter passive resistance as subordinates use subtle ways to avoid complying with the policy. Similarly, the methods (recruiting, training, use of symbols) that Kaufman (1960) found to be effective in the Forest Service's attempt to instill high levels of organizational identification in its employees are clearly all forms of concertive control. Kaufman's research, therefore, substantiates the importance of concertive control in creating and maintaining organizational identification. This conclusion was also supported by Bullis and Tompkins (1989), who found that a shift from these concertive practices to more bureaucratic ones resulted in decreased organizational identification among Forest Service employees.

Unobtrusive, concertive control depends on effective communication as a form of control and encourages the illumination of communicative processes in the social construction of reality. By constructing a collective reality, concertive practices facilitate the development of organizational personalities and, therefore, lead to increased organizational identification. Tompkins and Cheney (1985, p. 203) highlight the importance that personalized communication plays in strengthening organizational identification by concluding their review of several studies with the contention that "the highest identifiers with the firm received decisional premises via oral, face-to-face discussions with coworkers and superiors. The lowest identifiers, by contrast, relied more on print media... High identifiers seem to engage more often in oral communication (or at least perceive more) than low identifiers."

Thus, when communicative practices facilitate effective concertive control, identification is often enhanced and members may share a belief in the organization's mission and a common assumption regarding organizational reality, and they can be counted on to act in the best interest of the organization (Bullis, 1991). Based on these theories of concertive control and empirical investigations that support them, the following proposition is proposed:

Proposition 7: Unobtrusive, concertive systems of control based on effective communication and the inculcation of decision premises will result in higher levels of organizational identification than will obtrusive systems of control.

CONCERTIVE CONTROL AND ELECTRONIC PERFORMANCE MONITORING

The emphasis concertive control systems place on communication is a critical concern when considering the potential consequences of electronic performance monitoring on organization members and ultimately the pursuit of organizational goals. As Edwards (1979) argues, the implementation of technical systems of control, such as electronic performance monitoring, not only largely eliminates the need for direct supervision but also minimizes social interaction between superiors and subordinates and among coworkers. In essence, workers interact with the technology instead of with other people. As a result, the communication essential to concertive systems of control is greatly diminished and organizational identity becomes increasingly difficult to establish and maintain. This section will outline how electronic monitoring may be used concertively by indicating the role it plays in the double interact of control (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985) and identifying the main area for potential differentiation.

The double interact of control (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985; Weick, 1979) provides a framework for analyzing organizational control that closely parallels the three control tasks articulated by Edwards (1979). According to Weick (1979), communication cycles consist of an act, an interact, and a double interact. For example, Person A acts by sending a message to Person B, who either accepts or modifies the message (an interact). Based on this interact, Person A completes the double interact by sending a subsequent message to Person B. Tompkins and Cheney (1985) refine Weick's (1979) notion of the double interact of communication and identify a double interact of control that focuses on the interaction between a supervisor and subordinate. According to the double interact of control, organizing consists of three primary steps. First, the supervisor (Person A) acts by giving orders to a subordinate (Person B) who either complies or fails to comply with the order (interact). Next, the subordinate's compliance or non-compliance is monitored through feedback loops by the supervisor. Finally, the supervisor completes the double interact by rewarding or punishing the subordinate's compliance or lack thereof (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985, p. 195; see also Tompkins, 1990).

The various types of control (simple, technical, bureaucratic, and concertive) approach these interact tasks differently. In simple control, for example, the foreman gives orders or directions to the subordinate, directly observes the subordinate's performance, and personally rewards or punishes the worker. In certain types of technical control, technology provides workers with commands, monitors their work, and provides them with feedback with no direct superior/subordinate contact. With pure concertive control, in contrast, the decision premise provides commands and communication is essential throughout the interact. Nevertheless, Tompkins and Cheney (1985, p. 185) recognize that "[t]hese control strategies . . . all exist today, and often in various combinations rather than in pure forms or ideal types." Similarly, Mulgan (1991, p. 76) points out that "[o]ften in the same organization, ways of working have been restructured to both enhance hierarchic control within a tightly controlled system and to encourage new forms of soft control, based on mutual coordination, cooperation and devolved responsibility."

Thus it is possible that organizations that utilize one form of control at a particular stage in the double interact may employ a different control strategy at subsequent stages. For example, an organization may employ technical control in the first stage of the double interact by using technical apparatus, such as an assembly line, to direct workers. The same organization, however, may employ simple control in the second stage of the double interact by having supervisors directly observe subordinates as they work on the assembly line. Similarly, although electronic performance monitoring is clearly a technical form of control for directing and monitoring workers, it may be combined with other forms of control in the final stage of the double interact. For example, organizations may utilize the information gleaned from electronic monitoring to provide workers with feedback in a concertive, unobtrusive manner by emphasizing supportive, two-way communication.

Herein lies the main difference between effective and ineffective electronic monitoring procedures. There is little room for deviance in both the directing and monitoring of workers when technology is the primary organizational tool for executing these tasks. However, there are numerous examples of both obtrusive and unobtrusive use of electronically obtained performance data in the final stage of the double interact. Among the more prevalent examples of the obtrusive use of monitoring data in providing feedback are those in which workers receive messages such as "work faster," "concentrate," or "start over" on their computer screens (Marx, 1990; Ross, 1992). With such feedback practices, oral communication is often completely eliminated and what personal interaction does occur is minatory and obtrusive. Consistent with Tompkins and Cheney's (1985) argument that low identifiers rely more on print media, opportunities to strengthen organizational identification may be lost when feedback is provided in this manner.

Despite these examples of obtrusive feedback practices, however, there are numerous examples of organizations that use data obtained through electronic monitoring concertively by emphasizing positive reinforcement and supportive feedback (Gerdelman, 1993; Laabs, 1992). In these systems, personal interaction is maintained and is unobtrusive and nonthreatening. Thus employees will respond more favorably to the monitoring, and opportunities to instill organizational identification will abound.

Clearly, however, not all personal interaction and face-to-face communication is concertive, unobtrusive, or fair. Face-to-face communication that consists primarily of direct commands or is threatening or intimidating is more characteristic of simple control (Edwards, 1979). In view of the distinction between simple and technical control, such interaction may be perceived as more obtrusive and less fair than feedback provided by computer. It has been argued by some, for example, that electronic monitoring may not only reduce communication between supervisors and employees but may also alter the nature of the communication exchange between supervisors and employees. Amick and Smith (1992) report that monitoring can be used in a way that creates less supportive relationships marked by negative, coercive, and impersonal interaction. Nine to Five (1990) found that one of the major complaints of monitored employees is that monitoring sets up an atmosphere of suspicion and results in heavy-handed and demeaning discipline. Again, this type of personal interaction may be viewed as obtrusive and unfair. Therefore, management should not only maintain personal communication but also ensure that such interaction is supportive and nonthreatening. Consistent with this suggestion, Kidwell and Bennett's (1994) survey found that feedback sign (positive or negative), feedback frequency, and supervisor consideration were significantly related to satisfaction with monitoring.

Providing unobtrusive feedback has the potential to evoke positive employee responses not only because concertive control leads to increased organizational identification but also because positive performance feedback may be a powerful tool in improving organization members' self-image and confidence (McCarthy, 1986; Noe, 1988). Noe (1988) argues that improved self-confidence may come through psychological support, reinforcement for achievement oriented behavior, and specific task feedback. Thus it is argued that when firms utilize electronic performance monitoring to provide unobtrusive supportive feedback, they may reap positive results.

However, research in organizational justice indicates that performance feedback alone may be insufficient to maintain high levels of organizational identification. In addition, subordinates should be given opportunities to express their point of view and challenge evaluations derived from monitoring. Leventhal (1980, p. 43) argues that "a perceiver will attribute greater fairness to groups and organizations that provide legitimate avenues for challenging and overturning decisions." Greenberg (1986) similarly found that two-way communication and the ability to challenge/ rebut the evaluation were significant determinants of the perceived fairness of performance evaluations. It is reasonable to assume that these same factors will also contribute to the acceptability of performance evaluations derived from electronic monitoring. Hawk (1994), for example, found that providing employees the opportunity to discuss monitoring output with supervisors, including opportunities to challenge statistics or explain extenuating circumstances, reduced the stress associated with monitoring and led to feelings of increased evaluation fairness.

In essence, this research indicates that interaction in the final stage of the double interact of control should consist of both supportive feedback and open, two-way communication. Concertive control exercised in this manner should contribute to higher levels of organizational identification both directly and indirectly through its impact on perceptions of organizational fairness. Thus the following proposition is offered:

Proposition 8: To the extent that organizations use data obtained from electronic performance monitoring concertively by emphasizing open, two-way communication and supportive feedback, members will respond favorably to the monitoring and increased organizational identification and performance will result.

The preceding discussion should not lead one to conclude that concertive control and organizational fairness can be unequivocally equated. They are two distinct concepts and one can operate without the other. Indeed, Tompkins and Cheney (1985) express concern over the possibility that concertive control may unfairly result in over control. However, when concertive control is exercised in a way which serves to increase two-way communication and opportunities to challenge the evaluation system, it may increase perceptions of fairness (Greenberg, 1986). In addition, it is the perception of fairness, not its actuality, that elicits positive responses (Greenberg, 1988). As such, the effective use of concertive control may play a large role in determining what is perceived as fair and the degree of monitoring individuals will tolerate.

We have shown that electronic monitoring may constitute an invasion of worker privacy and result in increased stress and decreased performance. On the other hand, we have also demonstrated that the proper use of technology to monitor workers may produce benefits for both organizations and their workers. This article has combined and extended theories of organizational identification, concertive control, and organizational justice to account for the varied results companies experience with electronic performance monitoring. Using these theories, it has been argued that organizations must pay attention to how they design, introduce, and implement monitoring systems as well as to what they monitor and how data obtained through monitoring are used in the third stage of the double interact of control. When organizations involve employees in the design of monitoring systems, restrict monitoring to performance-related activities, and use data obtained through electronic means in a concertive manner by emphasizing two-way communication and supportive feedback, they are likely to reap positive results. However, when data gathered through electronic performance monitoring are used to provide feedback in an obtrusive or minatory manner, when monitoring includes nonwork activities, or when employees are not provided opportunities to express their point of view in the design and use of monitoring, the organization may experience negative results.

When organizations use the performance data obtained from a technical system of control in a humane, fair way by restricting monitoring and by emphasizing face-to-face communication they are employing, in fact, concertive forms of control. Consistent with Tompkins and Cheney's (1985) theory of concertive control, this approach may enable organizations to control their members through identification (Simon, 1976). Consequently, it can be expected that such practices will result in less subordinate resistance to monitoring.

In addition, because concertive control is simultaneously unobtrusive and a source of high morale (Bullis & Tompkins, 1989), the use of electronic monitoring in this manner may result in decreased employee stress, heightened satisfaction, and improved morale. Finally, because perceived organizational justice leads to increased effort on the part of organization members (Brockner et al., 1987), this approach can also be expected to improve an organization's productivity.

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By G. Stoney Alder and Phillip K. Tompkins, University of Colorado at Boulder

G. Stoney Alder is a doctoral student at the University of Colorado at Boulder. He is majoring in organizational behavioral and human resource management with a minor in organizational communication. His research interests include electronic performance monitoring, organizational justice, organizational communication, and business ethics

Phillip K. Tompkins is a professor of communication and comparative literature at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Tompkins is a fellow (and past president) of the International Communication Association. His interests in organizational communication include control (including his theory of concertive control discussed in the article in this issue) and resistance to various forms of control.